Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin: the unpredictable versus the inscrutable. It all comes down to those two characters, to the horror of high minds in both Europe and America. International lawyers will hate the thought that the Russian arch war criminal may hang on to his ill-gotten gains. It always seemed improbable that Putin would end up in court at the Hague. But surely he ought to be regarded as a gangster in charge of a pariah state, as opposed to being greeted with red carpets and grand limousines. But, at present, the red carpet lies open to him.
Diplomats are also alarmed. This is no way to conduct crucial negotiations. Normally, before the great ones actually meet, the sherpas have organised all the preliminaries. In effect, the heads of government already know the outcome. All that remains is the signing ceremonies followed by the vin d’honneur. This time, Steve Witkoff was charging around. One is assured that he is an able fellow. But he does not speak any Russian. How thoroughly has he been briefed about Putin?
The best advisors understand their boss’ mind and can often speak on their behalf without the need to refer back. Thus it was with the great Charles Powell when he was Margaret Thatcher’s foreign affairs private secretary. Could Witkoff, Marco Rubio or anyone else play the same role with Trump? That seems unlikely, given that the President has only a fitful grasp of his own mental processes.
Yet we can identify three Trumpian characteristics which may have a decisive outcome on events in Ukraine. The first is impatience. The President obviously enjoyed Monday’s proceedings, as the European leaders deferred to him, acknowledging his status as the leader of the Western alliance. But how long will this last? Trump is not famous for his attention span. If everything drags on, he will quickly be looking for someone to blame.
This leads on to the second characteristic. Trump believes in deals. However fractious the initial stages, he assumes that the day will end with a handshake and the odd compromise. Then everyone can leave more or less satisfied (in Trump’s case, he will try to make sure that it is ‘more’).
We can now see the lineaments of a deal. There would be a ceasefire based on the current frontlines. The Europeans, and probably the Americans too, would provide peace-keeping forces and security guarantees. Meanwhile there would be negotiations about a final territorial settlement. Those would drag on: no matter. Think Kashmir or Northern Cyprus. Il n’ya que le provisoire qui dure. The Ukrainian ceasefire line would evolve into a new boundary.
Neither the Europeans nor the Ukrainians would be happy with that. None of them wish to see boundaries altered by invasions. But there is a consolation. No one has yet signed anything away. At present, we would only be dealing with a ceasefire. Zelensky could assure his people that he has not agreed to the loss of a single square inch of Ukrainian soil. Equally, he and the Europeans would be uneasily aware of one point. If the ceasefire broke down because of Ukrainian or European intransigence, Trump would not be pleased. Indeed, he might take his bat and ball home, washing his hands – to switch metaphors – of European security.
This leads us to the final Trumpian modus operandi. Although he does not have a high reputation for sensitivity, the Donald seems to have a genuine distaste for casualties and is horrified by the butcher’s bill which war inevitably entails. Why can’t people behave sensibly and just get on with making money? It is surprising that he appears to have agreed to the deployment of US troops near the potential ceasefire line. He will not want to put those soldiers in harm’s way. In that respect, unpredictability ceases. Anyone responsible for causing any American casualty would have to reckon with a very angry and unforgiving President.
Let us now move to the inscrutable. We can assume that the invasion of Ukraine was a miscalculation. After Barack Obama’s Syrian red lines and Joe Biden’s scuttle from Kabul, Putin might reasonably have concluded that the US no longer possessed a superpower’s resolve. One suspects that over Ukraine his security service was telling him what he wanted to hear. Kyiv would fall in a few days. Most Ukrainians would crumble. Within months, Russia would have absorbed large chunks of Ukraine, leaving the rest to a puppet government.
Some crumble, some puppet. So what does Putin do next? He could accept the ceasefire, boasting to his own people that he has curbed the Ukrainian Nazis and kept Nato at bay. In Russian domestic terms, that might work. Putin seems to have a firm grip on any Russian political process. He might be tempted to switch off the meat grinder, stop turning large numbers of young Russians into bodybags and cash in his chips, knowing that the alternative is endless war, with a frustrated Trump proving Nato with more kit and the Europeans stoking up their defence budgets.
If that were the outcome, what happens next? There are those who argue that we would have opened a road to further conflict. Having grabbed about 20% of Ukraine, Putin would be looking at the Caucasus, the Western Balkans, the Russian minorities in the Baltic States, plus possibilities for troublemaking in the former Soviet central Asia – not to mention another crack at the rest of Ukraine.
Which would it be? He would know that even if a ceasefire held, Nato would enhance its defence posture. Would he want an arms race, or would be concentrate on domestic affairs and on strengthening Russia’s economy? Or would he indulge in fantasies about rebuilding the Soviet Union? We do not know. In Donald Rumsfeld’s exceedingly useful phrase, we are beset by unknown unknowns.
– the best pieces from CapX and across the web.
CapX depends on the generosity of its readers. If you value what we do, please consider making a donation.
Columns are the author’s own opinion and do not necessarily reflect the views of CapX.
