Angela Stent and Daniel Hamilton scrutinize the American response to two dangerous enemies.
When Chinese President Xi Jinping enjoyed an elaborate state dinner at the White House in September, one of the most important items—China’s relations with Russia—was not on the menu. It was an odd omission by his American host: Both China and Russia are supporting Iran, and Beijing is the key enabler of Moscow’s war against Ukraine.
More broadly, Beijing and Moscow have united to oppose American primacy and replace it with a “post-West” order, a joint goal that they touted yet again at the recent BRICS summit in New Delhi. Xi’s “no-limits” partnership with Russian President Vladimir Putin damages U.S. interests and constrains U.S. global influence. Their alliance enables both Xi and Putin to deal with U.S. President Donald Trump from a position of greater strength.
Early in Trump’s second term, the White House defended its desire to improve ties with Russia because it hoped to engineer a so-called reverse Nixon and pry Moscow away from Beijing. That argument disappeared because the strategy failed. Despite the president’s vow to “un-unite” Moscow and Beijing, his administration seems to have concluded that there is little it can do. In fact, Trump’s tariffs, sanctions, and war against Iran have pushed Russia and China even closer together.
It is time for the United States to reassess its passive approach to the two powers that most threaten U.S. interests and values. Given the depth and breadth of the Russia-China alliance and its centrality to both Putin and Xi, Washington cannot easily drive wedges between its two main antagonists, much less pit them against each other like the reverse Nixon argument suggests. Washington should avoid the false choice between a grand realignment on the one hand and a solidified China-Russia partnership at the United States’ expense on the other.
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